Joel Pineiro's unofficial outing today:

1 IP
8 H
7 ER
1 HR

Feel the excitement!

As an add-on to my previous post, it turns out that tonight's game set an NHL record for penalty minutes (419).

Who says the Sens aren't tough?

Well, that stunk.

Pretty exciting end to the game, though, particularly for you Old Tyme Hockey fans. This game was pretty much a live rendition of Slap Shot, right down to John LeClair playing the Ned Braden role, reluctant to involve himself in the mêlée. Here is your third period penalty breakdown:

3rd Period 

 Ottawa roughing - 2 min 9:03, D. Alfredsson  

 Philadelphia roughing - 2 min 9:03, A. Zhamnov  

 Ottawa roughing - 2 min 12:18, B. Smolinski  

 Philadelphia roughing - 2 min 12:18, P. Sharp  

 Ottawa slashing - 2 min 14:21, T. Simpson  

 Philadelphia too many men on the ice - 2 min 15:57, Bench served by P. Sharp 

 Philadelphia instigator - 2 min 18:15, D. Brashear  

 Philadelphia roughing - 2 min 18:15, D. Brashear  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:15, D. Brashear  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:15, D. Brashear  

 Philadelphia misconduct - 10 min 18:15, D. Brashear  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, D. Brashear  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:15, R. Ray  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:15, B. Radivojevic  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, B. Radivojevic  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, B. Radivojevic  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:15, S. Van Allen  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, S. Van Allen  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, S. Van Allen  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:15, D. Markov  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, D. Markov  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:15, T. Simpson  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, T. Simpson  

 Philadelphia goalie leaving crease - 2 min 18:15, R. Esche  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:15, R. Esche  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:15, R. Esche  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, R. Esche  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, R. Esche  

 Ottawa goalie leaving crease - 2 min 18:15, P. Lalime  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:15, P. Lalime  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:15, P. Lalime  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:18, R. Somik  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:18, C. Neil  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:18, M. Timander  

 Ottawa instigator - 2 min 18:18, Z. Chara served by M. Havlat 

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:18, Z. Chara  

 Ottawa misconduct - 10 min 18:18, Z. Chara  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:18, Z. Chara  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:21, M. Handzus  

 Philadelphia misconduct - 10 min 18:21, M. Handzus  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:21, M. Handzus  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:21, M. Fisher  

 Ottawa misconduct - 10 min 18:21, M. Fisher  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:21, M. Fisher  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:45, M. Recchi  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:45, M. Recchi  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:45, B. Smolinski  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:45, B. Smolinski  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:45, W. Redden  

 Ottawa misconduct - 10 min 18:45, W. Redden  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:45, W. Redden  

 Philadelphia holding - 2 min 18:45, J. LeClair served by S. Gagne 

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:45, J. LeClair  

 Philadelphia misconduct - 10 min 18:45, J. LeClair  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:45, J. LeClair  

 Philadelphia fighting - 5 min 18:47, P. Sharp  

 Philadelphia misconduct - 10 min 18:47, P. Sharp  

 Philadelphia game misconduct - 10 min 18:47, P. Sharp  

 Ottawa fighting - 5 min 18:47, J. Spezza  

 Ottawa misconduct - 10 min 18:47, J. Spezza  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:47, J. Spezza  

 Ottawa game misconduct - 10 min 18:47, J. Spezza  

I was perusing this fluff piece on Joel Pineiro when I came to a little segment that I had to read twice:

"Obviously, to get the contract he did over there in San Diego and to make them feel comfortable enough to move Ben Davis (to Seattle before the 2002 season), he obviously has some potential."

Perhaps it's just a poor choice of words, but this statements suggests that Melvin has no idea about Wiki's statistical background.

I certainly hope nothing tragic happened to Sabermariners...

We're all well aware of the organization's preference for signing good community guys; at this point, it's pretty much taken for granted that anyone the Mariners bring in has an extensive history of volunteering. So how much community involvement is there on this team, anyway? Well, thanks to the helpful links on Yahoo! player profiles, the following is a list including our projected 25-man roster and the number of charities or good causes for which they provide funding/services:

10 - Edgar Martinez
10 - Jamie Moyer
9 - Dan Wilson
8 - John Olerud
8 - Rich Aurilia
8 - Eddie Guardado
5 - Ichiro
5 - Ryan Franklin
4 - Bret Boone
3 - Freddy Garcia
2 - Dave Hansen
1 - Scott Spiezio
1 - Raul Ibanez
1 - Kevin Jarvis
0 - Joel Pineiro
0 - Gil Meche (although he gives a lot of money to medical professionals)
0 - Rafael Soriano
0 - Julio Mateo
0 - Shigetoshi Hasegawa
0 - Ron Villone
0 - Ben Davis
0 - Willie Bloomquist
0 - Ramon Santiago
0 - Randy Winn
0 - Quinton McCracken

For the sake of making things easier, we'll call the quantitative measure of each player's community involvement Bona-fide Examples of Noble Integrity and General Niceness. Your 2004 Seattle Mariners have an average of 3.0 BENIGNs per player, which blows Oakland's 1.28 out of the water (although Tim Hudson posted an astounding BENIGN rating of 11.0 last year). I'm sure that, given enough time, I could peruse each ML roster and calculate team-specific totals, but I think the results we already have are telling enough: when the Mariners target nice guys, they only go after the nicest. In recent years, we've pursued a single type of player, and it's nice to see the collection putting up such impressive results.

But wait! Is something amiss in the new front office? The nine players BB has brought in this past winter account for only 28% of the team's BENIGN rating, despite comprising 36% of the roster. Upon closer inspection, we realize that BB's nine have an average of 2.33 BENIGN points per player, whereas holdovers from the previous roster were a full 1.05 points better. Could BB be leading a stealth operation to gradually rid the team of its traditional Nice Guys? Keep an eye on this, as Spiezio and Ibanez, both with BENIGN ratings well below team average, have two of the three longest contracts on the roster.

When, five years down the road, Seattle's BENIGN rating is down to 0.7 and half our infield has been indicted for spousal abuse, don't say I didn't warn you.

Texas' starting rotation preview is up.

Get your Seattle preview here, Anaheim here, and Oakland here.

The second part of the Bavasi interview is up, too. Highlights from this edition include:

-Bavasi didn't consider non-tendering Garcia and going after Vlad, because "we'd already signed Raul and Scott..." (even though the Angels wound up signing Guerrero despite having brought in Guillen earlier)

-Ramon Santiago is considered a quality backup

-There was "good rationale" behind pursuing Omar Vizquel

-Bavasi strongly believes that closers need the right mentality to deal with "all the pressures"

-And, my favorite quote in the article: "In general, statistical analysis plays a tremendous role at the major league level."

Subscribe to Premium and read Bavasi's words; I don't do them justice. Can you believe that the guy doesn't think we have enough experience yet?

From Howard Lincoln's Q&A on MLB.com:

MLB.com: Would you vote to put Pete Rose in the Hall of Fame?

Lincoln: Well, I don't have a vote. Let's just say that I don't like people that lie, and leave it at that.

Hmm.

Let us never again claim that Safeco Field scares away the best hitters in the majors.

All right, I've read the interview and I'm not quite as bent out of shape by it as DMZ. I mean, at least ol' BB acknowledges the high risk inherent in drafting high schoolers, and that the team should be open to scouting and signing different types of players, rather than going all-out for, say, finesse pitchers (I'm looking at you, Dan O'Dowd). And hey, he also instituted a moderately successful system designed to keep young pitchers healthy in LA.

But you really have to hate a guy who uses "secret sauce" in a sentence. And the second half of the interview really is pretty bad. Jonah Keri makes a point of discussing Raul Ibanez, and BB hardly comes out of it alive. One particular Q&A caught my eye:

BP: What type of production are you expecting from Ibanez in 2004? In other words, what's the minimum level of production you'd expect for the money spent?

Bavasi: As with any player, it is fair to expect Raul to perform to the level he has in the recent past.

This is a shining example of the Wheelhouse's basic bad assumption. In the question immediately prior, BB explains that he doesn't think Ibanez will decline because certain people within the organization have "intimate knowledge" of the player in question, and are under the impression that Ibanez' career path will deviate from the overwhelming historical norm. This...this isn't particularly encouraging.

BB also prattles on about how he doesn't think we're worse defensively, and closes with a remark concerning Mike Cameron's proneness to strikeouts. Not really the kind of stuff I'd like to hear from someone who should theoretically be one of the 30 smartest baseball men in the world, but nothing he said took me by surprise, either.

Hellooooooooooo, comfort zone.

Wheelhouse put up the Seattle starting rotation preview today. Bonus points for reading all of it in one sitting.

Anaheim Angels 2004 Starting Rotation Preview

Safe to say, it was a down year for the starters. Fresh off what may be considered a “successful” season, the Angels were hoping that a staff anchored by Jarrod Washburn and an emerging Ramon Ortiz would aid the team in repeating its World Series title. 387.1 innings and 28 losses later, Mike Scioscia was left scratching his head, wondering where things went wrong.

The rotation as a whole regressed significantly from 2002. Its ERA jumped from 4.00 to 4.90, its WHIP by ten points, and its K/BB ratio decreased by 11%. Washburn and Ortiz were the primary culprits, as they allowed 55 more runs (32%) in 2003 than in their championship season. Disappointed with the staff’s inconsistency and fueled by an enthusiastic new owner, Anaheim brought in two of the most sought-after pitchers on the free agent market and will enter 2004 with a rotation featuring Bartolo Colon, Jarrod Washburn, Kelvim Escobar, John Lackey, and one of Ramon Ortiz/Aaron Sele. The Angels have been looking to move a starter for much of the offseason, but for now, being knee-deep in rotation depth might not be such a bad thing.

We will first consider the holdovers from last season in evaluating this year’s group of starters in Anaheim. While the 2003 defense wasn’t as strong as 2002’s league-leading performance (according to Defensive Efficiency), it remained among the top defenses in the league; the rotation benefited considerably from this, as only Scot Shields managed a defense-independent ERA (DIPS) below 4.80. The flyball-oriented staff took a hit whenever Darin Erstad was missing from the lineup, but the trio of outfielders on any given day could still be considered defensively sound. There is good news for 2004, as the new collection of starting outfielders (Guillen/Anderson/Guerrero) will be able to chase down more balls in the gaps, something that will benefit no one on the staff more than Jarrod Washburn.

Prior to 2003, Washburn had posted three consecutive sub-4 ERA seasons, with a peak coming in 2002. While his strikeout rate was consistently less than inspiring, the extreme flyball pitcher took advantage of a quick defense and proved himself as a successful pitcher. The success came to an abrupt stop last season, though, as a 79% increase in home runs and a significantly decreased strikeout rate saw Washburn’s ERA jump by an astounding 128 points. By striking out fewer batters, more balls were hit into the outfield, and with Darin Erstad being limited to 66 games in center field, nobody was hurt more than Washburn. It’s uncommon for a pitcher as young as Washburn to experience such a decrease in strikeouts, though, as his 5.12 K/9 ratio represented a career low, down 95 points from 2003. His struggles have been attributed to a sprained left shoulder suffered in a preseason near-collision with Brenden Donnelly, and this reasoning seems to be legit. After a quick glance at these facts, it seems like Washburn is due for a comeback year in 2004.

However, there’s a little more to the story than just the aforementioned argument(s). Steve, over at the Wheelhouse, has a different judgment of the situation, with a little help coming from Tom Tippett: extreme flyball pitchers will typically post low strikeout rates as a result of getting a bunch of weak pop-ups, and therefore making batters miss isn’t as critically important as it is with neutral pitchers. Steve suggests that Washburn struggled through 2003 were related to not fooling hitters, which causes the baseball to go a long way in a bad direction. Using this idea, Steve thinks that last year’s edition of Jarrod Washburn is more or less the Jarrod Washburn we should expect in the near future.

Assuming that this is generally correct, what percentage of Washburn’s struggles were caused by a permanent decrease in the ability to fool batters? More to the point, how much of an effect did Washburn’s injury have on his pitchability? It’s always a bit odd—and disconcerting—when a young pitcher sees a significant decrease in strikeouts, but in this case I think pitching with a sprained throwing shoulder accounted for many of Washburn’s struggles (be it with velocity or fooling batters). With a healthy shoulder, I’m looking for Washburn to put up an ERA slightly on the friendly side of 4.00.

John Lackey’s 2002 performance was the stuff dreams are made of. A midseason promotion from Salt Lake, Lackey carried his AAA success straight into the majors, posting a well-deserved 3.66 ERA despite having his peripherals translate accordingly. Coming off an unbelievable year capped off by a strong postseason performance, Lackey was looking forward to a 200-inning 2003 campaign with an ERA hovering in the high-3’s. However, PECOTA didn’t share his optimism, projecting Lackey for a 4.66 ERA in 123 innings. As it turned out, they were both right, with Lackey throwing 204 innings but raising his ERA by 97 points. Three main problems contributed to his 2003 struggles: a bunch of home runs, a rough start to the year, and luck. Prior to the season, Lackey’s career-high in home runs allowed was 16, but he nearly doubled that in serving up 31 gopher balls last year. Combined with difficulty finding the plate in April, Lackey began 2004 with a 7.52 ERA that would mar his final line. He also suffered from a defense that allowed 31% of balls in play off Lackey to fall for hits, well above the team average. The good news is that Lackey bumped his strikeout rate up to an above-average level, which bodes well for some future success. He needs to cut down the home runs and shave half a walk per game in order to achieve the level of performance he and his loved ones expect from him; more realistically, the home runs will come down, but the walks will hover around three every nine innings. Lackey should be a decent bet to put up an ERA in the low- to mid-4’s in 2004, a slight improvement over last year’s disappointing performance.

The last of the leftovers are Ramon Ortiz and Aaron Sele, who will be batting for the fifth spot in the rotation. Ortiz’ rough 2003 campaign isn’t difficult to figure out: while his home runs allowed came down from his astronomical 2002 total, he still gave up too many bombs, and allowing too many home runs, combined with a significant drop in strikeouts and a jump in walks, is a lousy recipe for success (think Ryan Franklin, with slightly worse command). Also, Ortiz was very fortunate on balls in play in 2002, as only 23.7% fell for his; this was unlikely to be repeated the next year. He was perfectly healthy for the duration of the season, starting 32 games for the third year in a row. Thus, there is no legitimate explanation for why his K/9 ratio dropped by 201 points, to a paltry 4.70, good for 80th place out of 91 qualified pitchers. Ortiz has a career K/9 of 5.97, well above his 2003 ratio, and with enough innings in 2004 he should be able to approach his career mean. However, it’s unlikely that he gets the chance (in Anaheim, anyway), and he still gives up too many home runs to be considered a dependable starter. While his high-4’s ERA and 200 innings would be far from worthless, it’s likely that the Angels stick someone less talented and more expensive in the back of the rotation. Ortiz would pitch better than he did last year, given the opportunity.

…which brings us to Sele, long considered one of the luckiest pitchers in baseball (in that his ERA never matched up with his peripherals). Sele is in the midst of a precipitous decline in strikeouts, having his K/9 drop each season from a peak of 8.17 in 1999 to 3.92 in 2003—which, had he thrown enough innings, would have been good for second-worst in the major leagues. In fact, not much went well for Sele last year, as he either matched or set career highs/lows in home runs, walks, and strikeouts. Not surprisingly, his ERA soared. Coming off a torn rotator cuff, Sele was expected to have some struggles, but his performance in the second half was markedly worse than his pre-ASB performance, suggesting that injury recovery wasn’t the primary factor in the down year. There isn’t much to indicate that Sele is due for a comeback year, as his numbers were declining before he got hurt. Nevertheless, it looks like he’s going to get some preferential treatment, and therefore won’t have to impress as much as Ortiz in order to get the final rotation slot. Keep an eye on this, as Ortiz would be worth and extra win or two over Sele. Anaheim’s #5 pitchers last year put up a 5.55 ERA; over a full year, Sele would just about match that figure, whereas Ortiz would improve it by about 60 points.

With the lack of a true rotation anchor, Anaheim went after Bartolo Colon, the prize of the free agent market. Colon’s ERA over the last few years:

1998 - 3.71
1999 - 3.95
2000 - 3.88
2001 - 4.09
2002 - 2.93
2003 - 3.87

Which one isn’t like the others? Despite unimpressive peripherals, including a career low in strikeout rate, Colon rode an improved walk rate, good fortune preventing home runs, and 117 innings against NL lineups in posting by far his best season in the bigs. This 2002 campaign artificially boosted Colon’s value, as teams saw him as a genuine elite pitcher in the major leagues, rather than a horse who’s good—but not great—at preventing runs. The Angels handed him $51m over four years in the hopes that he can rediscover traces of his 2002 form. While the contract is probably a little too long to be considered a good deal, in terms of performance, Colon will be both solid and durable for a few seasons. His three-year average VORP is 53.9, which would have placed him 10th in the majors last season, and tops among Anaheim pitchers in 2003 (11.2 points above the underrated Scot Shields). Colon became something of a flyball pitcher in 2003 (he’s been neutral for his career), and as a result his home runs increased by 50% from 2002’s total. However, he should have a better outfield defense with Anaheim than he did in Chicago, and so he’ll allow fewer extra-base hits, directly lowing his ERA. In addition, the Angels have one of the best bullpens in the major leagues, which should lower Colon’s innings pitched total and prevent any late-season fatigue issues (although Colon is the rare pitcher who doesn’t suffer from overwork). With a strong defense and a favorable park behind him, Colon should be good for 220 innings and a 3.60-3.70 ERA, much to the delight of Mike Scioscia and Angels fans alike, but a little worse than what Bill Stoneman and Arte Moreno would like for $51m.

Anaheim’s 2003 version of Colon came in the slimmer form of Scot Shields, who put up a 3.89 ERA in 13 starts after replacing Kevin Appier’s tattered remains in the rotation. Both Colon and Shields could be expected to put up similar ERA’s over 32 starts (with Colon being a little bit better), but the newcomer’s durability is something Shields could only hope to match, and so Colon will add more value to the rotation in 2004 than Shields would have last year (prorated over a full season).

And, finally, we come to Kelvim Escobar, one of the true enigmas among pitchers today. Escobar encompasses everything between stellar and lousy, putting up a 1.83 ERA last May, a 13.07 ERA last April, and three months of a mid-4’s ERA to finish the year. Bouncing between the rotation and the closer role likely plays a part in his performance, as it’s difficult to pitch at an optimal level when you don’t know whether you’ll be starting games or finishing them. There are some things to like about Escobar, but his shiny new deal has been justifiably criticized as too much of a commitment to an erratic pitcher. Over the last three seasons, Escobar’s ERA has been 82 points lower as a starter than a reliever, but this has a lot to do with his obscene 7.79 relief ERA in 17.1 2003 innings. He also has a 3.68 ERA away from Skydome since 2001, but this is entirely due to last year’s 2.76 figure, and his career splits are actually skewed 81 points in the other direction. Furthermore, Escobar is one of the rare Anaheim pitchers who manages to strike batters out at a good rate (7.89 career K/9), but he also walks too many guys, and his K/BB suffers as a result. As you may be able to infer from all this, Escobar’s numbers have been wildly inconsistent, which makes him difficult to project. One of his pluses, though, is a decent ability to keep the ball in the park, a surprising trait given his home park.

One consistency? 4.09 and 4.12 translated ERA’s from the past two seasons. These look about right for Escobar the Angel, although you have to apply a larger error bar than with the other members of the rotation. While I don’t have access to the numbers yet, I’m guessing that PECOTA’s probability rangers differ considerably, and so I’ll conservatively estimate that Escobar puts up a 4.00 ERA in a friendly park, give or take 25 points either way. Whatever the case, he’ll be a significant improvement in the rotation over Ramon Ortiz, circa 2003.

The Angels’ primary focus this offseason was bringing in starting pitching, and their transactions have given stability to a rotation that was 11th in AL ERA last season, despite playing in a pitcher-friendly environment. Last year’s edition allowed 505 earned runs in 928 innings. If this year’s rotation puts up a 4.40 ERA in the same number of innings—probably a conservative projection—doing so would represent a 51-run improvement over 2003, and would improve Anaheim’s Pythagorean record from 80-82 to 86-76—with the same offensive performance as last season. A 100-run offensive improvement gives the same team a 95-win projection, which could be good enough to capture the division. These estimates serve as educated guesses, however, and could easily deviate significantly from the final numbers. Nevertheless, what’s important to understand from this is that while the Angels may have overpaid for their improvements to the starting rotation, said upgrades will put the team in a good position to contend, given the concomitant offensive transactions. Vladimir Guerrero is going to get a lot of attention in 2004 (justifiably so), but the improved rotation will have just as much to do with Anaheim’s success as their new right fielder will.

You can find the Oakland preview here. Seattle's and Texas' will be posted as they become available.

Chris Snelling broke his wrist, and will miss one to two months.

I think it's time to consider crossing him off top prospect lists...

Will Carroll fills us in:

Perhaps Rafael Soriano could have used some of what's working for Tim Hudson. Slotted to be a primary set-up man, Soriano could miss as much as six weeks after a severe strain of his oblique. This could push Soriano to extended spring training if this goes the max expected length. Since muscles never fully recover, this could become something of an ongoing problem.

The blogosphere has been discussing Melvin's quotes regarding the mystique surrounding closers, so it's only appropriate that I link to DMZ's take on the subject, published a few hours ago. Key pieces:


A pure closer is a reliever who only comes in to protect a one- to three-run lead, only in the ninth. The worst pitcher in baseball stands a great chance of pitching the ninth inning without giving up three runs. With no outs, a team with an average offense against an average pitcher can expect to score half a run. The best offense in baseball last year, the Red Sox, averaged about .65 runs/half inning over the course of the season. The worst reliever in the major leagues last year was Jaret Wright, who gave up 46 runs in just over 56 innings of work--.82 runs an inning. Given a three-run lead in the ninth, pitching against the Red Sox, Wright could reasonably be expected to give up an average of a run each appearance, and if he did it all season, he'd rack up 20 saves, be anointed a proven closer, and sign with the Mets for $4 million a year.
...
A pure closer on an average team will probably only see 40, 50 chances to come into a game and pitch the ninth. Woolner's study also found that a perfect closer--one who never gives up a run pitching the ninth every time his team is ahead--only gives his team four more games in the standings. By contrast, a good but not quite elite offensive player or starting pitcher is worth four or five games; Barry Bonds was worth 11.5 wins last season. Eric Gagne, who was about as perfect as a closer can be in 2002, was worth only three games last year over what you'd predict for the Dodgers if they'd replaced him with innings from normal pitchers--and Gagne actually pitched more than one inning more than 10 times last year.
...
This reaches back to Ye Good Old Days, when teams didn't have closers, they had 'stoppers', the firemen who came in not just when the game was close, but when the starter was faltering. These brave souls would come in not with a lead and no one on, but with the game tied and two runners on--situations where being dominant and getting the outs has a clear and significant impact on the game's final score. These were situations where Gagne might strike out three guys to get out of the jam unscathed, while Jaret Wright's predictable single scores two runs and costs the ballgame. The tighter the situation, the more important it is to have your best pitcher on the mound. We understand this instinctually--you want your best hitter at the most important point in the game--but for some reason the modern mystique around the ninth inning has clouded the judgement of managers across the league.

As far as I'm concerned, the sooner people get over the idea of a "proven closer", the better; how many more teams have to be financially hamstrug by a Billy Koch kind of contract before they realize the error in their ways? How many more teams have to lose leads in the 7th and 8th innings by putting substandard pitchers on the hill before they bring back the idea of an ace reliever?

¡Viva la revolución!

Good stuff for the less statistically-inclined of you. Baseball Prospectus' free section has been running daily columns that explain some of their beliefs and statistics. Check them out here, and go back each day for a new piece.

They're finally on the way. Your AL West starting rotation previews will be here any day now. Be sure to check out the Wheelhouse, Athletics Nation, and Texas Ranger Blog for updates.

I wonder how long the P-I searched through the blogosphere before it could find enough appropriate blogs to mention in its column. I don't know how you can blow off Mariner Musings or Sports and B's in favor of Mariner Talk, which hasn't been updated since December 23rd; I guess the paper has to go to certain lengths to keep the pessimistic fan's opinion as far away as possible (I realize that the paper mentioned USS Mariner, but as the premier member of the blogosphere, that's all but necessary).

Rafael Soriano will be out a month with a strained oblique.